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WILL CHINA ALLOW ITSELF TO ENTER THE
NEW ECONOMY?
I.  INTRODUCTION
The development of the Internet in China presents a direct con-
flict between two of the country’s interests: its present desire to be-
come a global economic power and its traditional desire to control ac-
cess to information.  Historically, China has been wary of outside
influences.  In many ways the Internet embodies everything that
China has ever feared—a free flow of uncensored, uncontrolled, out-
side information, ideas, and news.  However, China has also made a
commitment to enter the world’s stage as an economic power.  The
Internet and e-commerce are currently the most dynamic worldwide
industry and the most popular pathway to wealth.  On the other hand,
development of this industry will require an influx of foreign capital
that will inevitably cause tension with longstanding protectionist poli-
cies.  Notwithstanding these fundamental conflicts, the potential for
Internet growth everywhere, and particularly in a country as populous
as China, is tremendous.
II.  HISTORY
China is one of the oldest nation-states in the world.  For thou-
sands of years, China was ruled by successive dynasties.1  Long closed
off to the rest of the world, it was forced open by the British in the
1840 Opium War.2  It became a republic for the first time in 1912.3  In
1949, after years of fighting, communist forces ultimately defeated na-
tionalist forces and took control of the country.4  The new govern-
ment, modeled after the Soviet Union’s, was called the People’s Re-
public of China.5  Under the new government, China was once again
Copyright  2001 by Ewan W. Rose.
1. See O. EDMUND CLUBB, 20TH CENTURY CHINA 9 (2d ed. 1964).
2. See Mark B. Baker, Forgotten Legal China, 17 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 363 (1995).
3. See IMMANUEL C.Y. HSU, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 575 (2d ed. 1975).
4. See id. at 761.
5. See id.
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closed off from the rest of the world.6  China finally began to open up
again with the implementation of its recent “open door” reforms.7
Development of the Internet began in 1969 when the U.S. De-
fense Department endeavored to create a computer network that
would remain viable in the event of nuclear attack.8  This secure net-
work to support military research was entitled the Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency Network (hereinafter “ARPANet”).9  It was
designed so that if any portion of the network were to become inop-
erable, a message could be rerouted, and thus could still be deliv-
ered.10
The network had spread to England and Norway by 1973, and it
continued to spread further with the adoption of a standard commu-
nication protocol in 1983, eventually becoming known as the “Inter-
net.”11
The Internet in China has a comparatively short history.  In 1995,
the Chinese made their first real attempt to utilize Internet technol-
ogy with the China Education Research Network, which connected
approximately one hundred Chinese universities to a global Internet
link.12  As China came to realize the importance of modernization in
this area, it embarked to strengthen its communication infrastruc-
ture.13  Plans included nearly doubling the phone line switching ca-
pacity of its system and offering more specifically Internet-oriented
services.14  Over the past several years, the Chinese government has
begun to take an active role in the development of the Chinese Inter-
net industry and is even using advertising campaigns to encourage use
of the Internet by its citizens.15
Despite this recent enthusiasm, there remains a deep concern for
too free a flow of potentially corrupting information.  China has tradi-
6. See Baker, supra note 2.
7. See Jay Zhe Zhang, Securities Markets and Securities Regulation in China, 22 N.C.J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 557, 558 (1997).
8. See Scott E. Feir, Comment: Regulations Restricting Internet Access: Attempted Repair
of Rupture in China’s Great Wall Restraining the Free Exchange of Ideas, 6 PAC. RIM L. &
POL’Y J. 361, 363 (1997).
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 365.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 365.  China committed 60 billion dollars over five years to making telecom-
munications infrastructure upgrades with the goal of having 420 million phone lines by 2010.
15. See id. at 366.
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tionally strictly controlled free expression and dissemination of in-
formation.16  To address these concerns, the government has enacted
the use of a “firewall” system that effectively blocks access to parts of
the Internet for Chinese users.17  The system will allow Chinese users
unlimited access to an internal network of other Chinese users, but
they will have to obtain approval to access an outside service pro-
vider.18  Internet Service Providers (hereinafter “ISPs”) are charged
with the task of using their router devices to filter out banned sites by
blocking their IP addresses.19  Outside commentators doubt the ability
of the Chinese authorities effectively to control information on the
Internet with this type of technology, and have suggested that China
will only be able to achieve its desired level of control by frightening
the people into silence and compliance.20
Much of the design for Chinese Internet control is embodied in
regulations issued on January 23, 1996.21  These regulations require
that all international Internet contact be performed through approved
“channels.”22  The regulations also establish a system of application
and monitoring to be carried out by the government.23  Companies
that are involved in a violation of these regulations, or any other state
laws or administrative regulations via their Internet activities, are
held liable under these regulations.24
III.  CHINESE INTERNET INDUSTRY
In order for the Internet industry to flourish in China, an influx
of capital is necessary.  This capital will probably not be available
16. See John H. Taylor, III, The Internet in China: Embarking on the “Information Super-
highway” With One Hand on the Wheel and the Other Hand on the Plug, 15 DICK. J. INT’L L.
621, 622 (1997).
17. See John T. Delacourt, Recent Development: The International Impact of Internet
Regulation, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 207, 216 (1997).  See also Taylor, supra note 16, at 635-636
(chronicling the Chinese government’s efforts to block access to certain sites.  Approximately
100 sites were banned in 1996, ranging from sexually explicit sites to major U.S. media sites to
sites containing information about Hong Kong and Taiwan).
18. See Delacourt, supra note 17, at 217.
19. See Taylor, supra note 16, at 637-38 (further stating that experts have warned that this
is not a use that the routers were designed for and may potentially cause problems).
20. See Taylor, supra note 16, at 638.
21. See Text of Interim Internet Management Rules, Xinhua News Agency, Feb. 2, 1996,
translated by F.B.I.S., available in World News Connection <http://wnc.fedworld.gov>.  See also
Feir, supra note 8 (discussing these regulations at length).
22. See 1996 Regulations Art. 5.
23. See 1996 Regulations Arts. 7-8.
24. See 1996 Regulations Arts. 13-15.
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domestically, but will likely come from a variety of other sources.
The future playing field for this investment game will be in large part
determined by the present players. An examination of the period
from September 1999 to March 2000 demonstrates the struggle be-
tween the desire to develop the Chinese Internet industry and the ef-
fort to maintain control of information, while providing insight into
the future direction of Chinese Internet industry investment.
A. The Players
Chief among the players that will shape the industry are the Chi-
nese Ministry of Information Industry, the Chinese Securities Regula-
tory Commission, the World Trade Organization (hereinafter
“WTO”) joint venture investors, and foreign firms that operate by
circumventing Chinese regulation.
1. WTO.  The WTO was established on January 1, 1995, in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s (hereinafter “GATT”)
Uruguay Round.25  The WTO has a variety of functions.  It adminis-
ters the WTO Trade Agreement, serves as a forum for ongoing mul-
tilateral trade negotiations, facilitates dispute resolution, reviews
policies and practices of members, and participates with the World
Bank and International Monetary Fund in economic policy making.26
Today the WTO is primarily a treaty-driven organization.27
The WTO entrance procedure has required, and will likely con-
tinue to require, China to make both economic and cultural conces-
sions.  While China has already made an entrance agreement with the
United States, it must make similar agreements with other member
governments before becoming a WTO member state.28  As of No-
vember 15, 1999, agreements were completed between China and
twelve of the member states in addition to the United States, includ-
ing Japan and Australia.29  Negotiations were still ongoing with
25. See General Agreement On Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Legal
Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
26. See Sue Ann Mota, The World Trade Organization: An Analysis of Disputes, 25 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 75, 76 (1999).
27. See Don Wallace, Jr. & David B. Bailey, Exceptions and Conditions: The Inevitability of
National Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment with Increasingly Few and Narrow Exceptions,
31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 615, 629 (1998).
28. See Elizabeth Olson, Many Steps to Go Before China Can Become a Full Member, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 1999, C11.
29. See id.
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twenty-eight other members, including the European Union (herein-
after “EU”).  The EU is requiring changes in Chinese regulation of
telecommunications to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of for-
eign firms and more transparent implementation.30  This has proved
to be a difficult concession for the Chinese to make, and thus far,
WTO entrance negotiations between China and the EU have not
been successful.31
2. Ministry of Information Industry.  The Ministry of Informa-
tion Industry (hereinafter “MII”) is the Chinese agency that has
taken the most active role in attempting to regulate the Chinese
Internet industry.  Traditionally, the MII has controlled the telecom-
munications sector.  At present, the MII, under the leadership of Wu
Jichuan, is attempting to extend its control to the new Internet indus-
try as well.32  Commentators have speculated that the ministry’s mo-
tive derives from the fear that a failure to regulate the Internet would
diminish the importance of the MII’s telecommunications sector, and
as a result the importance of the ministry itself.33  Other commenta-
tors have characterized the regulatory motive as primarily an effort to
control information:  “These new Internet ventures throw up new
problems for the Chinese government’s efforts to control informa-
tion.  And that is the government’s priority. . . .”34
Regardless of its motives, the MII is clearly one of the most im-
portant players in determining the shape of the Chinese Internet in-
dustry.  It is likely that the MII will continue in its effort to regulate
all facets of the industry.
3. Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission.  The Chinese Se-
curities Regulatory Commission (hereinafter “CSRC”) is a relative
newcomer on the Chinese political scene.  Stock markets in China
were only allowed in 1992 as a so called “experiment,” subject at any
time to being discontinued, by then Chinese leader Deng Xiao-Ping.35
30. See Wallace & Bailey, supra note 27, at 617.
31. See text accompanying note 70.
32. See Bruce Einhorn, Big Brother May Crush China’s Web Dreams, BUS. WK, Feb. 14,
2000, at 64.
33. See id.
34. Duncan Clarke (China analyst) (cited in China Moves to Further Control Information,
EXCHANGE TELECOMMUNICATIONS NEWSLETTER, Sept. 17, 1999) (stating that information
control trumped WTO membership as a government goal).
35. See Gao Xiqing, The Perceived Unreasonable Man – A Response to Fang Liufang, 5
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 271, 274 (1995).
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Currently, China has two national securities exchanges and numerous
other regional exchange centers.36  As of 1996, 390 companies were
listed on the Shanghai Exchange with an aggregate market capitaliza-
tion of 634.77 billion yuan.37
Chinese law requires prospective securities issuers to be ap-
proved by its overseeing ministry or local government, which then
makes the decision whether to submit the application to the CSRC.38
If the CSRC approves the application through a merit based approval
process, then the company may finally apply to be listed on one of the
exchanges.39
The CSRC enacts its regulations against a background of rela-
tively new and unrefined company law.40  The novelty of both the se-
curities and corporate law in China creates a somewhat unpredictable
environment for investors.  Furthermore, it is important to remember
that while the Chinese Securities System may resemble the U.S. sys-
tem in many ways, this system is not operating in a vacuum, but in
China, a country having virtually no experience with a market sys-
tem.41
4. Joint Venture Investors.  As a condition of the November
1999 WTO entrance agreement between the United States and China,
once China is a member of the WTO, foreign investors will be al-
lowed to be 49% owners of ISPs and ICPs, with this level rising to
50% in two years.  Although the government will regulate the indus-
try, foreign investment will be allowed.42
Under this system, foreign investors will be able to join with Chi-
nese investors to invest in Internet companies.  Joint venture invest-
ing in the industry has already begun.  International Data Group
(hereinafter “IDG”) has taken the lead in infusing venture capital
36. See Zhang, supra note 7, at p. 559.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 573.
39. See id.
40. See Gao Xi-Qing, statements at a conference at Fuqua School of Business, Duke Uni-
versity, Mar. 23, 2000.
41. See Minkang Gu & Robert C. Art, Securitization of State Ownership: Chinese Securities
Law, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 116 (1996) (stating that the Chinese government has not lost its
commitment to state ownership of the means of production, it only desires, through its reforms,
to enhance the productivity of state-owned enterprises).
42. See China-ISPs should be licensed by the Ministry of Information Industry, CHINA
BUSINESS INFORMATION NETWORK, Jan. 6, 2000.
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into the market.43 IDG has put much of its capital into e-commerce
companies.44  In return for a one million dollar investment, IDG typi-
cally takes a twenty-five percent stake in the enterprise.45  Early as-
sessment shows that this investment has been very successful for both
IDG and the enterprises, with many enterprises that planned to go
public at the year 2000.46
The history of joint venture investments in other sectors of the
economy provides little indication of what the future might hold for
this type of Internet investment.47  For example, foreign investment in
the retail industry was once severely regulated.48  Yet, in spite of the
national laws to the contrary, foreign investors, encouraged by enthu-
siastic local officials, began to invest in the industry.49  Although none
of these ventures had the proper licenses, and indeed in many cases,
foreign firms were majority owners in the ventures, the Chinese gov-
ernment ultimately succumbed to pressures from both the ventures
themselves and the local governments.50
However, in 1998, forty firms pursued the same strategy followed
in the retail industry, and ignored Chinese telecommunications regu-
lations in making deals with China Unicom.51  These investors had a
very different experience than those in the retail industry, because all
of these deals were all eventually declared illegal.52  This illustrates
the lack of investment predictability in this arena.  There are several
other negative aspects of joint venture investing in China. For exam-
ple, U.S. businesses investing in Sino-foreign joint ventures have tra-
ditionally experienced shortages of skilled workers and managers,
poor infrastructure, poor quality control, and foreign exchange short-
43. See Leslie Chang, One U.S. Investor Leads Pack in Chinese Internet Deals, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 1, 2000, at A18.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See generally Zhang Yuqing, Like Bamboo Shoots After a Rain: Exploiting the Chinese
Law and New Regulations on Sino-foreign Joint Ventures, 8 J. INTL. L. BUS. 59 (1987).
48. See IT Clashes with Legislation as China Moves to IT Maturity, Asia Computer Weekly,
Dec. 6, 1999; see also Xiqing, supra note 35, at 278 (acknowledging the problem of conflicts be-
tween central and local regulatory agencies).
49. See IT Clashes with Legislation as China Moves to IT Maturity, ASIA COMPUTER
WEEKLY, Dec. 6, 1999.
50. See id. This illustrates how taking local partners can help insure foreign investors
against political risks.
51. See id.
52. See id.
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ages.53  While it appears that joint ventures are probably a viable
source of capital, it is doubtful that this sole source of foreign capital
will be sufficient to fuel the entire industry.
5. Foreign Investors.  Some foreign investment capital will try
to access the potential of the industry without subjecting itself to the
vagaries of Chinese regulation and bureaucracy.  Sohu.com provides
a clear example of one business trying to accomplish this goal.
Sohu.com is foreign-owned, and thus would run afoul of the fifty per-
cent cap on foreign investors as an ICP.54  In an attempt to pull itself
outside the reach of the language of the rule, Sohu.com began to ag-
gregate content from seventy strategic partners. 55  Sohu.com holds no
stake in these partners, but some supply content exclusively to
Sohu.com. 56  This was an attempt to classify itself as an “aggregator”
as opposed to a “provider of content”57 and thus avoid investment
regulations, which at present have only been applied to ICPs and
ISPs. Whether this new classification that Sohu.com has invented for
itself will keep it outside of the rule remains to be seen.  The avail-
ability of this type of investing will depend on what loopholes can be
found by investors in the Chinese regulations, and how tenaciously
the Chinese choose to enforce these regulations.
B. The Game
Examination of the six-month period from September 1999 to
March 2000 can help reveal the current trends in Chinese Internet
regulation and future directions for the industry.  The events during
this period of time demonstrate the power struggle between those
players advocating more regulation and those desiring less.  From an
analysis of recent events, it appears that China is exhibiting a trend of
moving towards less, rather than more, regulation.
1. September.  In early September 1999, the MII took a hard-
line on foreign investment in the Internet.  Wang Lijian, MII vice-
director of news office, stated that “[t]hese Internet companies in-
cluding ISPs and ICPs, are using telecommunications lines to do val-
53. See Pat K. Chew, Political Risk and U.S. Investments in China: Chimera of Protection
and Predictability, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 615, 622 (1994).
54. See Matt Pottinger, Sohu.com Takes Novel Approach to Nasdaq Listing, REUTERS,
Feb. 17, 2000, at <http://biz.yahoo.com/rf/000216/bn4.html>.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
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ueadded [sic] telecommunications business. . .Under these circum-
stances, according to the spirit of the original regulations, they are all
prohibited from taking foreign investment;”  Wang went on to make a
statement that no doubt unnerved foreign investors, indicating that
“there are some companies that already have foreign investment and
have foreign investors; this is something the companies themselves
will have to take responsibility for.”58
While Wang’s announcement was ominous, the Internet industry
was at least outwardly optimistic.  Towards the middle of the month
Charles Zhang, CEO of Sohu.com, a primarily U.S.-owned firm,
stated that the MII was just trying to learn what the Internet was and
how best to regulate it.  “We provide a test case for the government
to study . . . it’s in the best interest of the government to promote
China’s information technology industry.”59  At this point, his firms
Sohu.com and Sina.com, both foreign-registered, stated publicly that
they wanted to raise foreign capital through public offerings on
NASDAQ.60
As September drew to a close, it was apparent that the govern-
ment was not ready to concede.  MII Minister, Wu Jichuan, stated
that foreign ICP investment was banned.61  However, Minister Wu
somewhat tempered his statements in a roundtable discussion during
the last week of the month.  He stated that “Of course, investors want
to make money.  We allow them to make money that is beneficial for
all parties.  Venture capitalists are welcome in China to help us de-
velop the high-tech industry.”62  He assuaged investor concerns, or
perhaps only further confused investors in continuing, “I have never
mentioned in my statements foreign investments in the Internet.  I
have never mentioned the content of the Internet.  I talked about the
ISPs and said that the current regulation does not allow foreign in-
vestment in operating telecommunications in China.  Giving approval
for the content is the responsibility of the broadcasting authorities.”63
This was the first time that the Ministry for Radio, TV and Film was
mentioned in public as having a regulatory role in Internet content.
58. Matt Forney & Jason Dean, Intel Ignores Chinese Curb on Investment in the Internet,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1999, at A11.
59. Id.
60. See China-US Companies Eye for Chinese Online Market, CHINA BUSINESS
INFORMATION NETWORK, Sept. 22, 1999.
61. See China-Yahoo! Admits Grey Areas in China Internet Venture, CHINA BUSINESS
INFORMATION NETWORK, Sept. 29, 1999.
62. Uncertainty Over China Internet Legislation, ASIA COMPUTER WEEKLY, Nov. 8, 1999.
63. Id.
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Wu stated that his primary concern in this arena was creating em-
ployment for those who would lose their jobs as a result of techno-
logical changes in society.  “That can also happen with e-commerce.
The goods have to be delivered by real people, and we have to look
into our own industry first.”64
Finally, a joint U.S. Foreign & Commercial Service and U.S. De-
partment of State report opined that new regulations, when issued,
would require ISPs to get a permit to do business, and would also re-
quire ICPs to be registered and recorded in the MII/PTA system.65
2. November.  In November, China came to an agreement with
the United States that specified conditions for entry into the WTO.
This Sino-U.S. agreement provided for 49% foreign ownership of
ISPs and ICPs, rising to 50% after two years.  Also, new regulations
will impose a licensing regime on Internet businesses, under which
ICPs will be managed both by the MII and by other government ad-
ministrative bodies that might regulate content.  ICPs must addition-
ally have approval from relevant administrative departments before
they can even apply to the MII to be connected with an ISP.66
After the signing of the Sino-U.S. WTO entry agreement, AT&T
announced plans to go ahead with a landmark Internet network serv-
ices joint venture.  MII minister Wu Juchuan had already granted the
project a unique exemption from the rules barring foreign investment,
which will remain in force until China completes the WTO entry pro-
cess.67
3. December.  In reaction to increased foreign involvement, the
Chinese State Press and Publication Commission announced new
controls on the distribution of publications, including on-line publica-
tions.  According to these guidelines, national distribution of publica-
tions will be limited to state-authorized distributors, and joint ven-
tures with foreign investment will be further restricted to retail
64. Id.
65. See Shujuan Cao, China - Internet Regulation, International Market Insight, Interna-
tional Copyright, U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service and the U.S. Department of State, Sept.
27, 1999 (reprinted in National Trade Data Bank Market Reports, Sept. 27, 1999).
66. See China-ISPs Should Be Licensed by the Ministry of Information Industry, CHINA
BUSINESS INFORMATION NETWORK, Jan. 6, 2000.
67. See China-Approval Looms for Landmark AT&T Internet Project in Shanghai, CHINA
BUSINESS INFORMATION NETWORK, Nov. 25, 1999.
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distribution only.  The stated purpose of this action is to prevent the
spread of state secrets.68
4. February.  As a response to the regulatory environment,
Sohu.com, with U.S. investors such as IDG and Pacific Century Cyber
Works, tried to recharacterize itself to avoid violating Chinese regula-
tions.  To accomplish this it dropped its original content and began to
instead aggregate it from seventy strategic partners.69
China’s future WTO membership push stalled in February. Chi-
nese and EU officials broke off talks on China’s admission to the
WTO.  The EU advocated the ability of foreigners to have a control-
ling stake in telecommunications networks, and additional business
licenses for European insurers.70 In addition to refusing to meet the
EU demands, China further stated that it would not enter the WTO
unless the United States ends its annual reviews, a vestige of the U.S.
sanctions imposed in the wake of the 1989 post-Tiananmen Square
crackdown.71
5. March.  In March, Lucent Technologies made a $100 million
deal to provide GSM mobile phone systems and Asynchronous
Transfer Mode technology, which allows phone lines to carry sophis-
ticated Internet services to several Chinese service providers, includ-
ing China Unicom.  This evidences the Chinese service providers’
rush to roll out state networks before foreign competition is allowed
as a condition precedent to entering the WTO.72
IV.  FUTURE OF THE INDUSTRY
The Internet industry in China will likely be shaped in the near
future.  Most likely, the same players that are presently affecting the
system will continue to do so.  These players will play a large role in
molding the future form of the industry as they all push for their own
conflicting interests.
The continued WTO membership process will force the Chinese
to make further concessions.  If the EU continues to place such an
68. See Market News- The Internet- Foreign Investment to be Allowed, CHINA ECONOMIC
REVIEW, Dec. 23, 2000.
69. See Pottinger, supra note 54.
70. See Craig S. Smith, China and Europeans Break Off Talks on W.T.O. Membership,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2000, at A11.
71. See id.
72. See Matt Pottinger, Interview-Lucent wins $100 mln in China Deals, REUTERS, Mar. 3,
2000, at <http://biz.yahoo.com/rf/000303/ec.html>.
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emphasis on opening the industry to foreign competition, the Chinese
will probably be forced to make changes accordingly.73
While the WTO membership will have a liberalizing effect, the
MII will counter this liberalization with new regulation and stricter
enforcement.  The MII is poised to secure a pivotal role in controlling
the direction of the industry.  Whether the ministry is motivated by
the traditional impulse to control information or by the need to pre-
serve its place in the power structure, its pattern of action to this point
reveals that the ministry will strive to extend as much control over the
Internet as possible.  The period from September 1999 to March 2000
reveals a cycle of MII over-enforcement, followed by a change of law
to temper the over-enforcement, followed once again by over-
enforcement of the new rule.  However, the overall trend seems to be
towards net erosion of MII control.  Minister Wu himself even ac-
knowledges the need for foreign investors’ capital.74  Furthermore,
forces in the government seem very dedicated to increasing foreign
investment.75  Thus, while it seems unlikely that the ministry will ever
relent entirely in its struggle to control the Internet, gradual loss of
control by the ministry is likely to continue.
The CSRC will likely continue to be a governmental agency fo-
cused on tempering over-control of the industry.  The CSRC may
play one of the larger roles in the process by continuing to fail to
make any move to curtail the operations of companies such as
Sohu.com.  While Sohu.com primarily does business in China, it is
registered abroad.  The CSRC could, but apparently has no plans to
try to limit this type of activity.76  This openness could provide an
outlet for internet companies that do not want to be concerned with
Chinese Company law and desire easier access to foreign capital.
Joint venture investment seems likely to remain a viable alterna-
tive for investment.  However, the amount of foreign capital that will
enter the industry through this conduit is largely contingent on how
heavily controlled the industry is.  One advantage of joint venture in-
vestment is that the foreign investor shares the political risks of the
73. See Olson, supra note 28.
74. See supra text accompanying note 64.
75. See Zhaodong Jiang, China’s Tax Preferences to Foreign Investment: Policy, Culture
and Modern Concepts, 18 J. INTL. L. BUS. 549, at 551-52 (1998) (stating that the Chinese Gov-
ernment has demonstrated preferential tax treatment for foreign investors through the use of
enterprise income tax, turnover taxes, and other applicable taxes).
76. See Gao Xi-Qing, statements at a conference at Fuqua School of Business, Duke Uni-
versity, Mar. 23, 2000.
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project with Chinese partners.77  Yet, heavy regulation would lead
more investors to try to tap the market through enterprises such as
Sohu.com or invest elsewhere.
Enterprises such as Sohu.com may be a factor in the industry,
depending on both the ability of the companies to stay one step ahead
of regulation and on how wide a net of regulation is thrown.  At the
moment, the prospects for these companies look promising since ap-
parently the CSRC is not going to move to control them, and the MII
seems to be relaxing its control a bit as well.
V.  CONCLUSION
Overall, it seems likely that the Chinese Internet industry will
obtain the foreign capital necessary for its growth.  Gradual relaxa-
tion of controls on information dissemination seem likely as well.
The Internet has the potential to greatly increase China’s prominence
as an economic power.  Its enormous market once tapped is an ex-
tremely valuable resource, both for the Chinese and the world as a
whole.  The process of exploiting this resource may also have the cor-
ollary effect of helping to alleviate some of China’s traditional fears
of outside contact and information.
While firewall protections can in some way limit access to the
internet, it seems unlikely that these type of protections can ever be
entirely leak-proof.  Leaks through the firewall may prove to be a
problem that grows exponentially, for as holes open, they will not
only whet Chinese appetites for outside information, but they may
also provide Chinese hackers with access to a whole worldwide com-
munity of computer knowledge that might further their ability to cre-
ate more holes in the firewall.  Regardless, no firewall can be entirely
impermeable, and the access that the Chinese are provided to the
outside world cannot but help fuel internal demands for increased ac-
cess.78
The Chinese government has in the past exercised almost com-
plete control over its domestic industries.  This model of control
seems particularly inappropriate in the new Internet economy.  Even
77. See Chew, supra note 53, at 620.
78. But see Wang Jisi, Global Viewpoint: Internet in China: A new fantasy?, BANGKOK
POST, Nov. 12, 2000.  This article argues that while there may be breaks in the firewall the
Internet will not have a liberalizing effect on China.  He states that the average Chinese web-
user does not fit the demographic profile of a political activist.   Furthermore he states that there
is better access to radical, nationalistic writings than more liberal pro-western materials—per-
haps due to selective censorship on the part of the Chinese government.
ROSE.DOC 07/12/01  2:44 PM
464 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 11:451
in the west, Internet companies are striking in their tendency to fall
outside of typical business models.  If the boardrooms of corporate
America seem befuddled at times by this new industry, surely Chi-
nese bureaucrats will not be in any better position to manage this in-
dustry effectively.  In the U.S. Internet industry companies are devel-
oping new management strategies to manage this new industry.  If
this ability and desire to innovate does indeed prove to determine the
winners and losers in the industry, then central control will be an inef-
ficient management technique.  At this point the industry is so vola-
tile, and there is so much uncertainty about which techniques of doing
business and which particular firms will ultimately be successful, that
it would be unwise for China to mandate any particular manner of
doing business.  This would be, in effect, putting all of its bets on one
horse in a race where the outcome is very uncertain.  No one at this
point has the ability to effectively predict the best way to approach
the Internet industry.  It would be impossible for China to
micromanage effectively an industry that no one can understand.
Another argument can be made that the Internet industry in
China can only be developed through trial and error.  In the United
States, Wall Street has struggled to predict which firms are develop-
ing products that will eventually prove profitable.  Potential techno-
logical advances, consumer preferences, and a myriad of other vari-
ables will eventually determine which firms’ products and approaches
will work in the American economy.79  Therefore, for China to go
with one approach may lead to its failure to maximize the power of its
internet industry by failing to try unorthodox methods that might ul-
timately be the most effective and efficient ways in which to use its re-
sources.
It should be noted that what works in America will not necessar-
ily work in China.  It would be a mistake for the Chinese government
merely to survey the experiences of countries that are ahead of it on
the development curve, and apply those lessons directly to China.
For example, there are obviously fundamental differences between
potential American and Chinese Internet users.  Beyond the ideologi-
cal and social differences between these two populations there are
other practical differences.  While in America, a large part of the
79. For example, look at the performance of one of the U.S. Internet industry’s biggest
players, Amazon.com.  Investors have continued in their belief in the potential of this firm de-
spite the fact that the e-tailer has yet to post profits.  Presumably intelligent investors have
placed faith in coming profits that the Amazon business model and consumer profits have not
yet delivered.
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commercial transactions in the Internet are made using credit cards,
credit cards are much less prevalent in China.80  This is a challenge
that the Chinese will be unable to look to the U.S. experiment for
guidance in overcoming and must develop a response to on their own.
Access to computers and the Internet is another problem that the
Chinese must tackle if they are to maximize the potential of their
Internet industry.  The number of Chinese Internet users that was
16.9 million in July of 2000 is growing, but is still relatively small.81  It
is even more enlightening to look at statistics that measure how well
connected Chinese enterprises are to the Internet.  Of the top 100
Chinese enterprises 26% did not have a website.  Most of the web-
sites contain a simple Chinese introduction to their enterprise, and
just 28% among those who have set up websites had one that was
characterized as “OK.”82  Half of China’s small and medium-sized en-
terprises do not have computers at all.83  Clearly the future develop-
ment of the Chinese Internet industry will be closely tied to increased
access to both computers and the Internet.
The Chinese Internet industry clearly faces many challenges in
the coming years.  While there is potential for China to use this new
medium to vault itself onto the stage as a world power, there still re-
mains the possibility that the Chinese government will squander this
opportunity out of anxiety for what the Internet could do to its tight
grasp on information.  It seems likely, though, that China will take
advantage of this opportunity to advance itself economically.  What
social consequences this undertaking might have will be interesting to
see.
Ewan W. Rose
80. See China-Visa-Consumer Debtors Help Boost Demand, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 5, 1999.
Visa currently has only 12 million cardholders in China accounting for 46.7 billion dollars in
1998.
81. See Jisi, supra note 78.
82. See Internet and E-commerce in China, ASIAINFO DAILY CHINA NEWS, Oct. 19, 2000.
83. See id.
